Yesterday morning, I was a guest on NTV Kenya’s Fixing The Nation with Mariam Bishar, Eric Latiff and Fellaris Wambui to discuss one of the most important digital economy policy debates currently unfolding in Kenya: the push to increase minimum fares for digital taxis.

The conversation was triggered in part by a major Business Daily headline that day: “Uber, Bolt drivers to get powers for setting fares.”

That headline captures where this debate has now reached.

This is no longer just an issue being discussed in WhatsApp groups, social media threads, or policy consultations behind closed doors. It has moved into mainstream media, national television, radio, newspapers, Parliament, the Competition Authority of Kenya, the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA), and the broader public arena.

That matters.

Because ride-hailing is no longer a niche urban convenience.

It is now part of Kenya’s mobility infrastructure, gig economy, digital payments ecosystem, public safety conversation, tax visibility architecture, and future-of-work debate.

This is precisely why the matter must be handled carefully.

The Debate Has Moved From Fare Complaints To Market Regulation

For several years, drivers on ride hailing platforms have complained about low fares, commissions, fuel costs, maintenance expenses, vehicle financing, rental obligations, deactivations, long working hours, and declining take-home income.

Those concerns are real.

Anyone who uses ride hailing regularly in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru or Eldoret has heard the frustration directly from drivers.

What has changed now is that the debate has escalated into a formal regulatory and competition-policy issue.

The proposed Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2026 introduces ideas such as strategic market position and superior bargaining position. In simple terms, this means regulators are looking beyond old-school ideas of monopoly and market dominance. They are asking whether digital platforms can exercise disproportionate power because of data, network effects, switching costs, market dependence, financial strength, and the role they play as gatekeepers between users and service providers.

That is a big shift.

It suggests that Kenya is beginning to ask deeper questions about how digital markets actually work.

Not just ride hailing.

Digital marketplaces more broadly.

This may disrupt many things. 

Ride-Hailing Is Now Too Big To Regulate Casually

During the Fixing The Nation conversation, we unpacked the scale of the market.

There are estimates of around 40,000 drivers in Kenya’s ride-hailing ecosystem.

There are around 2.5 million to 3 million people using these services.

Daily rides could be in the region of 200,000 to 250,000 trips.

The wider Kenyan gig economy has also been estimated at around US$1 billion annually, with ride hailing as one of its most important segments.

These are not small numbers.

This is not a side hustle story anymore.

It is a livelihoods story.

It is a transport story.

It is a technology story.

It is an urban planning story.

It is a tax story.

It is a labour rights story.

It is also a consumer affordability story.

That is why the debate cannot be reduced to a single question: Should fares go up?

The better question is: How do we improve driver earnings without shrinking the market that creates those earnings?

The Driver Problem Is Real

Let me be very clear.

Drivers are under pressure.

Fuel is expensive.

Vehicle financing is expensive.

Maintenance is expensive.

Insurance is expensive.

Tyres, spare parts, parking, washing, mobile data, and time spent in traffic all eat into earnings.

For drivers who rent vehicles daily or weekly, the pressure is even greater because the rental obligation does not disappear when the day is bad.

If you own the vehicle, your economics are different.

If you rent the vehicle, your economics can be brutal.

That distinction came up strongly in the Fix The Nation discussion.

An owner-driver and a rental driver may complete the same trip, at the same fare, on the same platform, but their take-home position can be completely different. The owner-driver may have a financing obligation or depreciation cost, but the rental driver has a fixed daily payment that must be made whether demand is strong or weak.

This is why the conversation must go deeper than fare increases alone.

If the real problem for many drivers is vehicle rent, then a higher fare can easily be captured by vehicle owners through higher daily rental charges.

If the real problem is fuel, then fuel support, better fleet economics, EV adoption, tax policy, or structured fuel partnerships may do more than a fare floor.

If the problem is financing, then asset-finance reform matters.

If the problem is deactivation and dispute resolution, then worker protection and due process matter.

If the problem is fatigue, then working-hour enforcement across platforms matters.

A fare increase may help.

But it cannot be the whole solution.

Minimum Fare Is Not The Same As Minimum Earnings

This is one of the most important distinctions in the debate.

A minimum fare is what the passenger pays.

Minimum earnings are what the driver actually takes home after fuel, rent, financing, insurance, maintenance, commissions, taxes, idle time, and other costs.

Those are not the same thing.

A driver can earn more per trip and still earn less per day if the number of trips falls sharply.

That is why I kept coming back to the demand side of the equation during the show.

The passenger matters.

Not because passengers matter more than drivers.

But because passengers are the demand base.

No passengers, no rides.

No rides, no driver earnings.

No driver earnings, no platform activity.

No platform activity, no formal digital transport ecosystem.

This is the part of the conversation that often gets lost when the debate becomes emotional.

What Happens If A KES 220 Ride Becomes KES 450 Or KES 500?

During the show, Mariam Bishar pressed me on the simulation question:

What happens if the base fare doubles?

That is the question Kenya needs to model seriously.

If a ride that costs KES 220 becomes KES 450 or KES 500, some passengers will still pay.

Context, matters too. 

If you are late for an important meeting, taking a child to school for an exam, heading to hospital, going to an airport, travelling at night, or trying to get home safely in the rain, you may pay.

But many other trips are discretionary.

Short trips may disappear.

Some passengers will walk.

Some will take a matatu.

Some will use a boda boda.

Some will move to tuk-tuks.

Some will carpool.

Some will negotiate directly with drivers off-platform.

Some will simply take fewer rides.

That is price sensitivity.

A higher fare per trip does not automatically mean higher total income for drivers if ride volumes fall.

This is the uncomfortable economic reality.

A driver doing 12 trips a day at a lower fare may be better off than doing five trips a day at a higher fare, depending on distance, time, fuel, rent, and idle time.

So yes, fares may need to rise.

But by how much?

For which vehicle category?

For which city?

For which trip distance?

At what time of day?

For cars only, or also motorcycles and tuk-tuks?

For economy, comfort, XL and corporate rides in the same way?

These details matter.

The Passenger Voice Is Still Missing

One of my biggest concerns remains that passengers have not been sufficiently represented in the policy process.

During the Fix The Nation discussion, we even tested this informally using a simple example: what would someone pay for a short ride from Nation Centre to the Stanley Hotel?

At KES 220, some may pay.

At KES 400 or KES 500, many would simply walk, buy an umbrella, wait out the rain, or choose another option.

That example may sound small, but it captures the entire demand-side issue.

Passengers are not abstract.

They are students.

They are young professionals.

They are parents.

They are small business owners.

They are employees going to client meetings.

They are night-shift workers.

They are people without cars.

They are people with cars who use ride= hailing because parking, safety, traffic or convenience makes it more practical.

They are also corporate users.

At Dotsavvy, my digital agency, our corporate ride hailing account has transformed how our team moves for meetings and work-related engagements. This is not just an individual consumer product. It is also business infrastructure.

So when we talk about minimum fares, we are also talking about company transport budgets, SME productivity, employee mobility, and urban efficiency.

That is why passengers and business users need to be part of the conversation.

The Platform Is Not Just A Middleman

There is also a tendency to describe platforms as though they simply sit in the middle and extract commission.

That is too simplistic.

The platform creates the marketplace.

It connects demand and supply.

It provides the app, GPS, routing, payments, pricing, identity, trust, customer support, driver onboarding, security tools, complaint channels, promotions, marketing, digital receipts, trip records, and in many cases, tax visibility.

Before ride hailing apps came into the market, taxis were far more expensive and far less accessible to everyday users.

Traditional taxis still existed, but they served a narrower market.

Ride hailing apps expanded the transport market. Massively. 

They made taxi-like mobility accessible to people who would never previously have considered taking a taxi for routine movement.

That is one of the most important things the platforms did.

They did not just take market share from old taxis.

They created new demand.

That does not mean platforms should not be regulated.

They absolutely should.

But regulation should recognize the infrastructure they provide.

In a nutshell, without the marketplace, the driver may still have a car, but no efficient way to find enough passengers.

Without the marketplace, the passenger may still need a ride, but no trusted, transparent way to find one quickly.

This is the value of the platform.

The debate should scrutinize it.

But it should not pretend it does not exist.

Commission Transparency Still Matters

The 18% commission cap remains one of the most contested issues.

Drivers want to know whether platforms are complying.

Passengers want to understand where the money goes.

Regulators need visibility.

Platforms need to explain their cost structure more clearly.

During the Fix The Nation conversation, we discussed a simple KES 1,000 ride.

If the commission is 18%, that is KES 180 retained by the platform before considering applicable taxes. The remaining amount flows to the driver, subject to whatever other costs the driver bears.

But this is where transparency becomes important.

What exactly is commission?

What is tax?

What is funded by the platform?

Who pays for discounts?

Who pays for promotions?

What happens when a passenger gets a subsidized fare?

How much does the driver actually receive?

How are incentives structured?

These questions should not be left to speculation.

Trip-level transparency would improve trust immediately.

Not just between drivers and platforms.

But across the whole sector.

Public Discourse Is Getting Louder

The public reaction to this issue has been intense.

Driver groups have pushed back against arguments that appear to slow down reform.

Some people argue that more analysis is simply another delay tactic.

Others argue that drivers have been patient for too long and that the current system has already failed them.

Some users say fares are already difficult to afford.

Some drivers say platforms must lower commissions.

Some commentators say government must address fuel taxes, road conditions, vehicle import taxes, and financing costs.

Others have suggested subscription-style models.

Some have asked why platforms cannot absorb more of the burden.

These are all valid debate points.

But they also show why the issue cannot be solved with one number.

This is not just about a fare floor.

It is about platform work.

It is about fair compensation.

It is about market power.

It is about competition.

It is about transport affordability.

It is about worker classification.

It is about safety.

It is about whether digital platforms are now so embedded in Kenya’s economy that we need more sophisticated rules for how they operate.

The Competition Authority’s Proposal Adds A New Layer To An Already Hotly Debated Matter

The Business Daily story adds another layer because it shifts the conversation from transport regulation to competition regulation.

If the Competition Authority (CAK) gains stronger powers to examine whether digital platforms hold a strategic market position or superior bargaining position, the debate becomes bigger than fares.

It becomes about whether digital platforms can shape markets even without being classic monopolies.

That is a very modern regulatory question.

It mirrors what regulators in Europe, the United States, India and other markets have been grappling with when it comes to large digital platforms.

The issue is no longer only: does a company dominate a market?

The issue is also: does a company control a critical gateway that many people and businesses depend on?

In ride hailing, that could include drivers, passengers, fleets, restaurants, couriers, advertisers, payment providers, insurers, and other dependent actors.

This is why Kenya’s ride hailing debate could become a test case for broader digital platform regulation.

The ILO Platform Work Convention Adds Global Context

There is also a global labour context that Kenya cannot ignore.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has now adopted its Convention on Decent Work in the Platform Economy.

That development matters.

It shows that the question of platform worker protection is no longer a fringe debate. It is now part of global labour policy.

Platform workers need transparency.

They need safety.

They need fair treatment.

They need protection from unjustified deactivation.

They need proper dispute resolution.

They need voice.

They need dignity.

Kenya should align with this approach. 

But again, translating those principles into local regulation requires serious prior considerations. 

A global convention does not tell us what a minimum fare from Kilimani to Westlands should be.

It does not solve the owner-driver versus rental-driver question.

It does not tell us how to price a boda boda versus a car.

It does not automatically define every platform worker as an employee.

It creates a framework of worker protection.

Kenya still has to build the practical model.

Tanzania Remains A Useful Cautionary Case

During the show, we also discussed Tanzania.

This example has become controversial because some people see it as a platform talking point.

I do not think it should be treated that way.

It should be treated as a case study.

A few years ago, Tanzania introduced price and commission controls in its ride hailing market. The result created stress in the market. One major operator exited. The market had to be recalibrated. Drivers ended up with fewer options, not more.

That does not mean Kenya should avoid regulation.

Kenya is not Tanzania.

But the lesson is still useful:

1. If regulation makes the unit economics impossible, the market can shrink.
2. If the market shrinks, drivers lose trips.
3. If drivers lose trips, earnings can fall even when fares rise.

That is the risk Kenya must avoid.

The EV Question Deserves More Attention

One of the points I raised on Fixing The Nation is that we should not only ask how to increase fares.

We should also ask how to reduce driver operating costs.

Electric mobility is already showing what is possible in the boda boda segment.

Electric motorcycles can significantly reduce fuel and maintenance costs. That is why adoption is growing so quickly.

If the same logic can gradually extend to four-wheel ride hailing, the driver earnings conversation changes.

Lower operating costs mean more of the fare can remain with the driver.

But that requires supportive policy: lower taxes on electric vehicles, charging infrastructure, battery financing, fleet partnerships, and asset-finance models that actually work for drivers.

This is the kind of solution that deserves more attention.

Because sometimes the best way to improve take-home income is not only to increase what passengers pay.

It is to reduce what drivers spend.

What Should Happen Next?

Kenya needs a broader settlement for ride-hailing.

Not a shouting match.

Not a one-sided regulation.

Not endless delay.

A serious settlement.

That means several things:

1. Enforce the existing 18% commission cap transparently.
2. Require clear trip-level earnings breakdowns so drivers understand exactly how each fare is split.
3. Include passengers and business users in public participation.
4. Distinguish between owner-drivers and rental drivers.
5. Investigate vehicle rental and financing models because these may be central to driver distress.
6. Model passenger willingness to pay before setting any final fare floor.
7. Differentiate fares by vehicle category, city, time, distance and trip type.
8. Strengthen protections around deactivation, dispute resolution and safety.
9. Address cost-side pressures such as fuel, insurance, maintenance, road conditions and vehicle taxes.
10. Create a review mechanism so that if fare increases reduce demand or driver earnings, the framework can be adjusted quickly.

That is what smart regulation looks like.

Final Thoughts

The ride hailing minimum fare debate is now bigger than ride hailing.

It is about how Kenya regulates digital work.

It is about how we protect people whose livelihoods depend on platforms.

It is about how we preserve passenger affordability.

It is about how we maintain competition.

It is about how we keep transactions formal, visible, safe and taxable.

It is about how we support innovation without allowing unfair market power.

It is about how we build a digital economy that works for workers, consumers, investors and the state.

That is why I keep coming back to one point:

The issue is not whether regulation is needed.

It is.

The real issue is whether the regulation is smart enough.

A higher fare may be part of the answer.

But it is not the whole answer.

If the problem is fuel, address fuel.

If the problem is financing, address financing.

If the problem is vehicle rent, address rental models.

If the problem is commission, enforce the cap.

If the problem is platform transparency, require transparency.

If the problem is passenger affordability, measure willingness to pay.

If the problem is driver welfare, build worker protections.

If the problem is market sustainability, regulate the ecosystem — not just the fare.

That is where Kenya needs to go next.

Watch the full Fixing The Nation discussion on YouTube and listen to the podcast version on Spotify.

YouTube: 

Spotify: